In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure by Kuo, Susan S. & Taylor, C. W.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 38
Issue 4 Summer 2007 Article 2
2007
In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois
Disclosure
Susan S. Kuo
University of South Carolina School of Law
C. W. Taylor
Bradford University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law
Journal by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Susan S. Kuo, & C. W. Taylor, In Prosecutors We Trust: UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure, 38 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 695 (2007).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol38/iss4/2
In Prosecutors We Trust:
UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure
Susan S. Kuo* & C. W. Taylor**
IN TRO DUCTIO N ...................................................................................... 696
I. THE ILLINOIS DISCLOSURE EXPERIENCE ............................................ 699
A. The Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence in Illinois ............ 699
1. Federal Constitutional Disclosure Requirements .......... 699
2. Illinois Disclosure Requirements .................................. 702
B . D isclosure V iolations ........................................................... 704
C. Illinois Proposals for Reform ............................................... 708
II. THE UK DISCLOSURE EXPERIENCE .................................................. 710
A. The Development of Disclosure in the United Kingdom .... 711
B. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 ......... 715
C . C PIA D isclosure .................................................................. 719
III. UK LESSONS FOR ILLINOIS DISCLOSURE ........................................ 723
A . Lessons Learned .................................................................. 723
B . R eal R eform ......................................................................... 729
C O N CLU SIO N ......................................................................................... 73 1
* Associate Professor, University of South Carolina School of Law; Vanderbilt University School
of Law, J.D.; Duke University, A.B. The author would like to thank her co-author for his kind
invitation to write this article and Cathryn Wallace for her excellent research assistance. The
author would also like to thank Jason Richardson and Professors David Harris and Cynthia Ho for
their comments on prior drafts of this article. Finally, the author is grateful to Illinois
Representative James B. Durkin and Professors Roger Leng and Lawrence Marshall for their help
in providing critical information necessary for the completion of this article.
- Lecturer, Bradford University; University of Durham, Ph.D; University of Teesside, LLB.
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
INTRODUCTION
It is of critical importance to [Illinois], and fundamental to our system
of government, that we have a criminal justice system upon which we
can rely to produce a just and fair result. Revelations of wrongful
convictions and miscarriages of justice inevitably undermine the
confidence of the general public in the reliability of the criminal
justice system as a whole. 1
American prosecutors have a duty to uphold justice. In the words of
the United States Supreme Court, the public prosecutor is "the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty.., whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done."2 The prosecutor's role
as a "minister of justice" 3 gives rise to the prosecutorial responsibility
of assuring that the criminal justice system produces fair results. 4 To
ensure just outcomes, prosecutors are tasked with distinct
responsibilities, including disclosure obligations to turn over
exculpatory information to the defense.5 This obligation is rooted in the
United States Constitution and is commonly referred to as the Brady
rule.6 A failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defendant "casts
the prosecutor in the role of an architect of a proceeding that does not
comport with standards of justice" and thus violates due process. 7
As is the case across the United States, troubles abound in Illinois
with respect to prosecutorial compliance with the Brady rule. Failures
to disclose became especially visible in recent years amidst revelations
pointing to the "persistent problems in the administration of the death
penalty" in Illinois. 8 Illinois quickly became the center of a media
1. ILLINOIS GOVERNOR'S COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S
COMM'N ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), cmt. to Recommendation 83 [hereinafter RYAN
COMMISSION REPORT].
2. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a
minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.").
4. See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 ("It is as much [the prosecutor's] duty to refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to
bring about ajust one.").
5. See infra Part L.A (discussing the Brady rule that requires prosecutors to turn over
exculpatory evidence to the defense).
6. In Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the Supreme Court set forth the prosecutorial
disclosure duty. See infra Part I.A.1 (discussing the Brady rule).
7. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87-88.
8. EXECUTIVE ORDER AS ISSUED BY FORMER GOVERNOR GEORGE RYAN CREATING THE
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maelstrom; the nation watched as innocent men continued to surface in
the Illinois prison system.9  After thirteen wrongfully convicted
individuals were released from death row, the then Illinois governor,
George H. Ryan, imposed a moratorium on further executions and, in
May 2000, created a Commission on Capital Punishment to study the
state capital punishment system. 10  Among the many injustices
uncovered by the Commission were prosecutorial failures to disclose
exculpatory evidence to the defense, 11 including the suppression of
promises made to state witnesses, 12 and police failures to investigate
alternative leads and suppression of exonerating evidence. 13  Serious
COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2000), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/
ccp/executive-order.html [hereinafter ORDER] (last visited on May 10, 2007).
9. Illinois first grabbed media headlines in the late 1990s, starting in 1996, with the death row
exonerations of the "Ford Heights Four." See infra note 13 and generally DAVID L. PROTESS &
ROBERT WARDEN, A PROMISE OF JUSTICE 230-36 (1998) (documenting media reactions to
exonerations of four death row inmates). This was followed by the Chicago Tribune's 1999
series entitled "The Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois." Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, The
Failure of the Death Penalty in Illinois (pts. 1-4), Cm. TRIB., Nov. 14-18, 1999, at 1. Interest in
Illinois developments peaked again in 1999, with the exoneration of Anthony Porter, who was
released within forty-eight hours of his scheduled execution. See Andrew Bluth, Illinois Man Is
Finally Cleared in 2 Murders: An Armed Robbery Conviction Lingers from a Murder Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1990, at A20; Sharon Cohen, Last-Minute Exonerations Fuel Death-Penalty
Debate Justice: Wrongful Convictions Shift Focus from Morality to Legitimacy, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
15, 1999, at Al.
10. ORDER, supra note 8. To date, eighteen individuals have been released from Illinois'
Death Row. Steve Mills, State to Free 18th Person Who Was on Death Row, CHI. TRIB., May 27,
2004. In January 2003, then Governor Ryan commuted the sentences of 167 inmates on death
row to life in prison. Frank Main, Ryan Fights Subpoena Seeking Testimony on Pardons, CIE.
SUN TIMES, April 19, 2005, at 22.
11. RYAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 125 n.3 (describing People v. Hobley, 696
N.E.2d 313 (Ill. 1998), in which the State failed to turn over potentially exculpatory information,
and People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092 (Ill. 2000), in which the State apparently failed to turn
over complete police reports).
12. RYAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 125 n.8 (discussing People v. Olinger, 176
Ill. 2d 326, 342-51 (1997), in which a key government witness testified untruthfully as to
promises made by the State in exchange for his testimony).
13. See RYAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-9, 48-49 nn.53-54 (describing
several wrongful conviction cases in which physical evidence connecting the defendants to the
crimes was lacking and leads to other potential suspects were overlooked or ignored). Law
enforcement misconduct in the "Ford Heights Four" case was particularly egregious. In this 1978
case, four Cook County men were convicted for the double murder of a man and woman. Id.
Two were sentenced to death and two were sentenced to extended terms of imprisonment. Id. In
1996, all four were exonerated after new DNA tests revealed their innocence. Id. at 8. Prior to
their trials, the Cook County Sheriffs police obtained a lead pointing them in a direction away
from the accused men. Peter M. King & William H. Jones, Crimes of the State: Obtaining
Justice for the Wrongfully Imprisoned, 29 LITIG. 14, 17 (2002). The police eventually abandoned
the lead and concealed the evidence they had unearthed. Id. Years later, this hidden evidence
was revealed along with prior inconsistent statements made by state witnesses that were never
produced. Id. Journalism students at Northwestern University used this evidence to track down
the old lead and attained confessions from the true murderers, thus bringing about the release of
Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
concerns about the death penalty process also prompted the Illinois
Supreme Court to appoint a special committee to propose new rules
pertaining to capital cases. 14 Both the Commission and Committee
proffered a host of suggestions, including measures for preventing
Brady violations. Several of these proposals have been adopted by the
Illinois legislature and courts. 15
Owing to its attempts to better protect the rights of the accused,
Illinois has become the bellwether of criminal justice reform in the
United States. 16 Across the country, states are contemplating ways to
improve the administration of criminal justice and are looking to Illinois
for guidance. Formerly the state that triggered the current national
crisis of confidence in the American criminal justice system, Illinois
now serves as a role model for other states seeking to avert future
instances of false conviction. 17
This Article endeavors, by comparative study, to assess the potential
of the Illinois reforms to actually alleviate miscarriages of justice and
strengthen prosecutorial observance of the Brady imperative.
Specifically, this Article examines the Illinois prosecutor's
responsibility to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense and
evaluates the likelihood that the latest amendments to the disclosure
obligation will meet with success in view of the problems encountered
by the United Kingdom in implementing similar reforms. Part I
provides an overview of the government's duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense. 18 This Part also discusses prosecutorial failure
to satisfy disclosure requirements and state proposals for guaranteeing
compliance with federal and state directives. 19 Part II discusses the
United Kingdom's disclosure experience, from its common law origins
the Ford Heights Four in 1996. Id. at 18. See generally PROTESS & WARDEN, supra note 9, at
230-36 (discussing the Ford Heights case).
14. Steve Mill, Bar Raised for Capital Case Trials: State High Court Sets Standards, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 23, 2001, at 1. Examination of the Illinois capital punishment system was conducted
by other groups as well, including both House and Senate task forces and private groups. RYAN
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 4-5.
15. See infra Part I.A.2 (discussing the adoption of proposals offered by the Commission and
Committee).
16. See Joseph L. Hoffmann, Welcoming Remarks, 80 IND. L.J. 29, 29 (2005) (describing
reforms suggested by Ryan Commission as "potent catalyst for death-penalty reforms
elsewhere"); Franklin E. Zimring, Symbol and Substance in the Massachusetts Commission
Report, 80 IND. L.J. 115, 118 (2005) (describing 2002 Ryan Commission Report as
"extraordinary... in a field which has been virtually non-literate prior to 2002").
17. See Hoffmann, supra note 16, at 29 (noting that many states have followed Illinois' lead in
examining possible problems in the administration of the death penalty).
18. See infra Part I.A.
19. See infia Part I.B.
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to the current statutory regime of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 ("CPIA"). 20  This Part also describes the
CPIA's detailed framework for advance disclosure of exculpatory
evidence to defense solicitors.21 Part III contemplates the changes to
Illinois laws and ethical provisions in light of the UK disclosure
experience, focusing especially on the UK experience with the CPIA.22
Illinois' struggles with disclosure and efforts to reform its system track
the UK's disclosure dilemmas and its attempts to resolve them.23
Consequently, a comparison of the two systems as well as discussion of
the UK experience with disclosure under the CPIA should prove
instructive for state policymakers dedicated to advancing the due
process protections secured by the Brady rule.
I. THE ILLINOIS DISCLOSURE EXPERIENCE
Illinois prosecutors bear evidentiary disclosure responsibilities under
both the United States Constitution and state rules. Recent findings,
however, show that prosecutors do not always fulfill their disclosure
obligations. To address these shortcomings, the Illinois legislature and
courts have sought ways to ensure that state prosecutors disclose
exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants.
A. The Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence in Illinois
1. Federal Constitutional Disclosure Requirements
In Brady v. Maryland,24 the United States Supreme Court held that
"the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused
upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either
to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of
the prosecution. '"25 Brady was an extension of prior Court decisions
20. See Parliament, Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, ch. 25 [hereinafter
CPIA], available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts1996/1996025.htm (last visited May 10,
2007); see infra Part IL.A-B.
21. See infra Part II.C.
22. The CPIA changes to the common law duty of disclosure have been severely criticized
and proved unworkable in practice. See infra Part 11.B (discussing how the CPIA altered the
common law duty of disclosure).
23. In particular, though, the present UK structure provides for a broader range of discovery
than that which exists in Illinois, the Illinois proposals for reform are markedly reminiscent of
several CPIA provisions and the Illinois amendments follow a similar overall trajectory as
disclosure obligations established in the CPIA. See infra Part ll.B (describing the disclosure
structure followed in the UK).
24. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
25. Id. at 87.
2007]
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condemning government actions in misrepresenting or suppressing the
truth in criminal cases.26  These earlier cases established that a
conviction is invalid if attained through the use of evidence known by
the State to be false.27 Likewise, the earlier precedent established that a
State cannot allow false evidence to remain uncorrected, regardless of
its innocence in soliciting the untruthful information. 28  This
requirement of candor before the court comports with the "rudimentary
demands of justice" 29 and is "implicit in any concept of ordered
liberty."930
The purpose of the disclosure rule is to ensure fair trials, and the
failure to comply with the Brady rule violates due process. 31 As stated
by the Brady Court, "Society wins not only when the guilty are
convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly." 32
The suppression of Brady material inflicts harm on an accused 33 and
undermines public faith in prosecutorial integrity34 and the accuracy of
criminal convictions. 35  Accordingly, a conviction resulting from a
failure to disclose cannot stand.36
Following Brady, the Court and lower federal courts have continued
to develop the prosecution's duty to disclose. Pursuant to the due
26. Id. at 86 (citing Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) and Pyle v. Kansas, 317
U.S. 213, 216 (1942)).
27. In Mooney, allegations that the prosecution deliberately suppressed impeachment evidence
lead the Court to declare that "depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of
court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured" violates due process
guarantees. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. In Pyle, the Court declared that allegations of government
use of perjured testimony and deliberate suppression of favorable evidence were sufficient to
charge a deprivation of due process rights. Pyle, 317 U.S. at 216.
28. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-70 (1959).
29. Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112.
30. Napue, 360 U.S. at 269.
31. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87 ("The principle ... is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a
prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused.").
32. Id.
33. See id.; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 n.10 (1976) (noting "the harm to the
defendant resulting from nondisclosure").
34. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 88 (stating that failure to disclose "casts the prosecutor in the role
of an architect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice"); Agurs, 427 U.S.
at Ill (stating that prosecutor "must always be faithful to his client's overriding interest that
'justice shall be done' and "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer") (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)).
35. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 440 (1995) (stating that disclosure rule "will tend to
preserve the criminal trial as the chosen forum for ascertaining the truth about criminal
accusations"); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) (stating that disclosure rule
ensures "that a miscarriage of justice does not occur").
36. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 440.
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process mandate, the prosecution must divulge exculpatory evidence,
including evidence that can be used to impeach a prosecution witness,37
even in the absence of a request for information from the defense. 38
The disclosure rule applies regardless of the good or bad faith of the
prosecution in falling short of its command; 39 the rule is equally
applicable to negligent and willful nondisclosures.40 What is more, "the
individual prosecutor has a duty to learn of any favorable evidence
known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case,
including the police" and thus may be charged with knowledge of
exculpatory evidence known to other government entities. 4 1
The Court has also set limitations on the otherwise broad duty to
disclose by defining what evidence is material to guilt or punishment.
Evidence is material if there is a "reasonable probability" that the result
of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been
disclosed. 42 A reasonable probability is "a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome."43 Not every failure to disclose,
however, amounts to a "true" Brady violation. 44 A "true" Brady
violation transpires only when the "nondisclosure was so serious that
there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would
37. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). The government, however, is not
charged with disclosing favorable information that would be inadmissible as evidence unless a
reasonable likelihood exists that the result would have been different at trial. Wood v.
Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1995) (finding no Brady violation stemming from failure to
disclose inadmissible polygraph information showing that key prosecution witness had lied). Cf
Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11 th Cir. 1999) ("Inadmissible evidence may be material if
the evidence would have led to admissible evidence.").
38. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 106-07. In Agurs, the Court established differing standards of
materiality for failures to disclose, based on whether the defense requested the withheld
information and, if so, whether the request was a specific or general request. Id. at 108-12.
These standards were replaced by the uniform criterion of Bagley. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682
(abandoning Agurs categories of "specific request," "general request," and "no request").
39. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 153; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
40. United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1968); Ingram v. Peyton, 367 F.2d
933, 936 (4th Cir. 1966); Levin v. Katzenbach, 363 F.2d 287, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Ashley v.
Texas, 319 F.2d 80, 84-85 (5th Cir. 1963).
41. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. Others acting on the government's behalf may include not only
law enforcement agencies and officials, such as other prosecutors and investigators working with
a prosecutor's office in addition to the police, but also non-law-enforcement agencies as well.
See infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
42. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984))
(creating a standard for addressing claims of ineffective counsel).
43. Id. (quoting Stickland, 466 U.S. at 694). In Kyles, the Court reaffirmed the reasonable
probability standard and further explained that such standard was met if the undisclosed
exculpatory evidence "could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as
to undermine confidence in the verdict." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.
44. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999).
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have produced a different verdict.- 45  Furthermore, information is not
material if it is cumulative of previously disclosed information 46 or if
the accused had knowledge of the information or the ability to acquire
such information with reasonable diligence. 4
7
2. Illinois Disclosure Requirements
To facilitate government compliance with constitutional disclosure
requirements, the State of Illinois has implemented rules to address
prosecutorial obligations. In particular, the Illinois Supreme Court has
adopted Rule 412(c), which provides: "[T]he State shall disclose to
defense counsel any material or information within its possession or
control which tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense
charged or which would tend to reduce his punishment therefore."
48
The Due Process Clause already imposes this obligation, but the Illinois
rule does not limit the duty to disclosing only evidence material to the
guilt or punishment of the accused. 49 Rather, the rule commands the
state to produce any exculpatory evidence.
Rule 412(c) also requires the prosecution to "make a good-faith
effort" to identify these materials at the time of disclosure if such
identification is possible.50 To this end, the commentary following the
rule provides examples of information likely to be exculpatory or
mitigating, including a statement that someone other than the defendant
45. Id. (distinguishing between "so-called Brady material" and true Brady material).
46. See, e.g., Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 518-19 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding undisclosed
impeachment evidence to be cumulative and hence non-material when credibility of key
prosecution witness had already been effectively undercut); United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d
249, 257 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that undisclosed evidence that is merely cumulative is not
material).
47. See, e.g., Johns v. Bowersox, 203 F.3d 538, 545 (8th Cir. 2000) (stating that no
suppression violation occurs "if defendant could have learned of the information through
reasonable diligence [or] when the defendant and the State have equal access to the
information"); Westley v. Johnson, 83 F.3d 714, 726 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding no Brady violation
because information sought was "readily available").
48. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c). The Illinois Supreme Court crafted section (c) to comply with the
mandate of Brady and its progeny. See Committee Comments to ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412. The rule
does not, however, apply to protected materials such as attorney work product or information
that, if disclosed, poses a risk to national security. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 412(j). In addition, courts
possess discretion to require additional or to deny disclosures to the defense. ILL. SUP. CT. R.
412(h) and (i).
49. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text (discussing how it is irrelevant whether the
prosecutor intended to withhold disclosure or was negligent in doing so and discussing the
standard for materiality).
50. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c). This obligation reinforces but is not as far-reaching as the duty to
disclose. Id. at Committee Comments. In addition, the rule prohibits the defense from offering at
trial the State's identification of information as possible Brady information as evidence that the
materials negate or mitigate the defendant's guilt. Id.
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committed the crime, a non-inculpatory scientific test result, and
impeachment evidence that calls into question the veracity of testimony
provided by a government witness.51  The purpose of the added
identification requirement is to "reinforce" prosecutorial obligations and
lessen the likelihood of failure to comply with the Brady rule.
52
To aid prosecutors in ascertaining the extent of their disclosure
responsibilities in any given case, section (f) of Rule 412 requires the
State to "ensure that a flow of information is maintained between the
various investigative personnel and its office . . . ."53 Furthermore,
should the defense request materials or information that is in the
possession or control of a governmental entity or individual other than
someone in the prosecutor's office, section (g) directs the State to make
a good-faith effort "to cause such material to be made available" to the
defense.
54
Illinois prosecutors are also bound by Rule 3.8 of the Illinois Rules of
Professional Responsibility, 55  which reaffirms prosecutorial
responsibilities under Brady:
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation
shall make timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the
defendant if the defendant is not represented by a lawyer, of the
existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government
lawyer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigate the
degree of the offense.56 As is the case with Rule 412(c), disclosure
51. Committee Comments to ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412.
52. Id.
53. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(f). In capital cases, the prosecution must specially certify 14 days
before trial that it "has conferred with the individuals involved in the investigation and trial
preparation of the case and represents that all material or information required to be disclosed
pursuant to Rule 412 has been tendered to defense counsel." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 416(g). This rule
ensures that the prosecution has met the requirements of Rule 412. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 416(f)(iii).
54. ILL. Sup. CT. R. 412(g).
55. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2001).
56. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(c) (2001). The duty of a prosecutor embodied in
the Illinois rule derives from the American Bar Association ("ABA") Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Supreme Court's opinion in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78,
88 (1935). ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2001). In particular, ABA Model Rule
of Professional Conduct 3.8(d) states that a prosecutor in a criminal case shall:
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged
mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is relieved
of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2006); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3) (1983); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARD 3-
3.11 (1993) (setting forth similar standards for disclosure). For an interesting discussion about
recent attempts to address prosecutorial conduct by enhancing ABA Model Rule of Professional
20071
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under Rule 3.8 is not limited to material exculpatory evidence.
5 7
Additionally, Rule 3.8 provides a reminder to the prosecutor of her
ethical duty to "act fairly, honestly, and honorably": 5 "The duty of a
public prosecutor or other government lawyer is to seek justice, not
merely to convict."5 9
B. Disclosure Violations
Notwithstanding the disclosure rule, Brady violations frequently
occur.60 A recent Chicago Tribune analysis of thousands of court
records nationwide revealed that, since the Court delivered its opinion
in Brady, the homicide convictions of at least 381 defendants have been
overturned because prosecutors concealed exculpatory evidence or
knowingly presented false evidence. 61  Forty-six of these defendants
were convicted in Illinois courts.6 2  According to a national study of
death penalty verdicts, prosecutorial misconduct, primarily the
suppression of exculpatory and mitigating evidence, is the second most
frequent explanation for serious error in capital cases. 63  Case studies
show that suppressed exculpatory material can be evidence indicating
that someone other than the defendant actually committed the crime,
prior inconsistent statements made by government witnesses,
Conduct 3.8, see Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial Ethics As Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573.
57. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (expanding the State's obligation under
Rule 412(c) to disclose any exculpatory evidence).
58. ILL. RULES OFPROF'LCONDUCTR. 3.8 cmt. (2001).
59. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2001). This section is a recent addition to the
Illinois ethical rules and characterizes the duty of the prosecutor as stated by the Illinois Supreme
Court in People v. Cochran, 145 N.E. 207, 214 (1924) (stating that the prosecutor "is the
representative of all the people, including the defendant, and it [is] as much his duty to safeguard
the constitutional rights of the defendant as those of any other citizen"), and Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.
60. Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REv. 393, 431 (2001) ("Brady violations are among the most common
forms of prosecutorial misconduct."); Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of
Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21, 56-57 (1987) (detailing hundreds of
wrongful convictions, including many in which prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence).
Unfortunately, most violations likely go undiscovered. See Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without
a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 833, 869 (1997) ("For every one of these cases, we have
every reason to suspect that there are many more in which the prosecutor's refusal to disclose the
exculpatory evidence was never discovered by the defendant or his attorney.").
61. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at
C I. Of the 381 defendants, 67 had received death sentences. Id.
62. Id. ("Illinois' record for misconduct by prosecutors is particularly abysmal.").
63. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System Part II: Why There Is So Much Error in
Capital Cases and What Can Be Done About It, Feb. 11, 2002,
http://www2.law.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/index2.htmd. Nineteen percent of reversals
stemmed from prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory and mitigating evidence. Id.
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psychiatric exculpatory evidence, or testimony about physical
evidence. 64 Some prosecutors have also been known to present false
testimony about physical evidence. 65
Failures to meet disclosure obligations may arise from the
prosecution's deliberate decision to withhold information from the
defense. 66  For example, in the infamous Ford Heights Four case, in
which four men were wrongfully convicted of a 1978 murder, the
prosecutors presented false and misleading scientific evidence during
the trial.67 They also allowed witnesses to lie about benefits used to
induce their testimony.68
Refusals to disclose, however, are not always willful. Oftentimes,
prosecutors are simply unaware of or lack access to evidence that must
be made available to the defense. Prosecutors typically rely on
investigating agencies and other individuals to supply information
regarding a case and thus may not have in their immediate possession
all information that should be released to the defense. For example,
exculpatory information may be in the knowledge and possession of
others acting on the government's behalf, such as another prosecutor, 69
law enforcement officers, 70 or even other governmental agencies. 71
64. Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A
Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 700-01 (1987) (citing cases involving these various types of
suppressed material).
65. Id. at 700 (citing cases involving this type of Brady misconduct).
66. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963). In Brady, the prosecution
knowingly withheld a statement made by the defendant's alleged accomplice in which the
accomplice admitted to committing the homicide. Id. Brady did not learn of the statement until
after he had been sentenced to death for first-degree murder. Id. See also Mooney v. Holohan,
294 U.S. 103, 110 (1935) (discussing the prosecution's deliberate suppression of impeachment
evidence concerning the credibility of government witnesses).
67. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Reversal of Fortune, CH. TRIB., Jan. 13, 1999, at NI.
For a brief description of the Ford Heights Four case, see supra note 13.
68. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 67, at N1. The Ford Heights Four were exonerated
eighteen years later by DNA testing and brought a civil rights action against the Cook County
Sheriff s Department after exculpatory evidence was discovered in the prosecution's files.
Testimony of Professor Lawrence C. Marshall, Professor, Northwestern University School of
Law before the Prosecutorial Misconduct Committee of the Illinois Legislature (June 21, 1999)
(on file with author) [hereinafter Marshall Testimony]. The suit was eventually settled. See
Robert Becker, Ford Heights 4 to Get Their Settlement from County, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1999,
at N3 (describing the $36 million settlement). For a more detailed description of this case, see
Armstrong & Possley, supra note 67, at NI.
69. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). In Giglio, the prosecutor
failed to disclose impeachment evidence known to another attorney in the office, but not to the
prosecutor. Id.
70. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 671-72, 676 (1985) (finding error in the
prosecutor's failure to disclose an informant possessed by and known only to Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms); United States v. Wood, 57 F.3d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1995) ("For Brady
purposes, the FDA and the prosecutor were one.").
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Moreover, an investigative officer may be disinclined to release
evidence favorable to the defense for fear that it will harm the
prosecution's case or in the belief that it is immaterial.72 The
suppression of exculpatory or mitigating information by law
enforcement officers can make the prosecution's task of disclosing
Brady materials difficult.73
Another reason for lack of compliance with disclosure imperatives
may be a prosecutor's overzealous commitment to advocacy.7 4  The
desire to win a case may cause some prosecutors to concentrate their
sights solely on achieving victory, at the expense of upholding justice. 75
The quest for success can affect a prosecutor's ability to objectively
weigh the materiality of potentially exculpatory evidence, a
71. See, e.g., Wood, 57 F.3d at 737 (imputing to the prosecutor information possessed by other
government agencies involved in investigating case); Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 43-58
(1987) (finding that the defendant was entitled to Brady information known to a non-law-
enforcement protective service agency to which the prosecution had no access and of which the
prosecution was unaware). But see United States v. Morris, 80 F.3d 1151, 1169-70 (7th Cir.
1996) (refusing to impute knowledge to the prosecutor of information unknown to the prosecutor
and possessed by government agencies uninvolved in the investigation of the case). For a
summary of federal circuit court approaches to determining the extent of the prosecutor's duty to
search for Brady material not in his immediate possession, see Mark D. Villaverde, Note,
Structuring the Prosecutor's Duty to Search the Intelligence Community for Brady Material, 88
CORNELL L. REV. 1471, 1493-1512 (2003).
72. Laurie L. Levenson, Police Corruption and New Models for Reform, 35 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 1, 34 (2001).
73. See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty to Seek Exculpatory
Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons from England, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1379 (2000) (discussing
the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidence known to the police).
74. Numerous law review articles have addressed this issue. See, e.g., Michael E. Gardner,
Note, An Affair to Remember: Further Refinement of the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose
Exculpatory Evidence, 68 MO. L. REV. 469, 480 (2003) ("[Plrosecutors can, in good faith,
downplay or overlook exculpatory evidence because they have difficulty in acting as a 'minister
of justice' rather than as a 'zealous advocate."'); Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a
Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 355, 390 (2001) ("The desire to win inevitably
wins out over matters of procedural fairness, such as disclosure."); Weeks, supra note 60, at 843
(discussing how "the kind of objective determination of materiality required by Bagley is capable
of being made only by saints"); Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time To Take
Prosecution Discipline Seriously, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 275, 278 (2004) (noting that in some
wrongful conviction cases, "a team of police and prosecutors were so convinced of their
righteousness that they were willing to do anything to get their man") (quoting BARRY SCHECK,
PETER NEUFELD & JIM DwYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 175-76 (2000)); Fred C. Zacharias,
Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND.
L. REV. 45, 107 (1991) (discussing "conflicting mandates" placed on prosecutors to be zealous
while tempering zeal).
75. Armstrong & Possley, supra note 67, at CI ("Winning has become more important than
doing justice.") (quoting Professor Alan Dershowitz); Marshall Testimony, supra note 68
(discussing how some prosecutors "forget that judgment and wisdom are key job qualifications
for the position-not simply the ability to obtain convictions at whim").
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phenomenon referred to as "tunnel vision" or "confirmatory bias." 76 In
particular, a prosecutor may "convince [herself] that a satisfactory
reason justifies not providing the exculpatory evidence, such as 'the
defense must have discovered it themselves,' or 'it is just an aberration
and does not really undercut the prosecution's case."' 77
Finally, the consequences of a Brady violation are not particularly
daunting. Even if the defense learns about the exculpatory evidence, 78
to gain a new trial, the defendant must show that the failure to disclose
denied him a fair trial.79 The standard for evaluating these claims is
strict: the defendant must demonstrate that there exists a reasonable
probability that disclosure of the information would have changed the
outcome of the proceeding. 80 This showing is often quite difficult to
make once the government has procured a conviction. 81 Moreover,
prosecutors rarely face professional discipline for suppressing evidence,
76. See, e.g., Thomas F. Geraghty, Tr"ing to Understand America's Death Penalty System and
Why We Still Have It, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 209, 233 (2003). This bias may also
compromise the integrity of police investigations. Id. See also RYAN COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 1, at 20-21. The Commission Report describes tunnel vision as "the single-minded
and overly narrow focus on a particular investigative or prosecutorial theory, so as to
unreasonably colour the evaluation of information received and one's conduct in response to that
information." Id. at 45 n.4 (quoting a Canadian inquiry into cases of wrongful conviction).
77. Levenson, supra note 72, at 34. Levenson also remarks that "[p]rosecutors are particularly
likely to lose their judgment if they enjoy a close working relationship with the officers whose
misconduct will be disclosed when impeachment or exculpatory information is revealed to the
defense." Id. at 35.
78. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets
Brady, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1133, 1145 (2005) (noting the unlikelihood that exculpatory
evidence will be discovered); Weeks, supra note 60, at 869 ("For every one of these cases, we
have every reason to suspect that there are many more in which the prosecutor's refusal to
disclose the exculpatory evidence was never discovered by the defendant or his attorney.").
79. Prior to conviction, courts will often remedy Brady violations by ordering late compliance.
Levenson, supra note 72, at 34.
80. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). In Bagley, the Court declared that
"evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A 'reasonable
probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. See also
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-34 (1995) (asserting that the defense must show that "there
is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
proceeding would have been different").
81. Levenson, supra note 72, at 35. Critics of the "reasonable probability" standard argue that
it is too demanding and thus encourages prosecutors to withhold Brady evidence. See, e.g.,
Weeks, supra note 60, at 870; Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv.
393, 438 (1992) (stating that, in practice, if "a conviction results, reversal will not be ordered
unless an appellate judge can conclude that the trial jury probably would have acquitted the
defendant had the evidence been disclosed"); Rosen, supra note 64, at 707-08 (asserting that "a
prosecutor knows that a decision to withhold or falsify evidence, even if discovered, will not
necessarily result in a reversal of the conviction").
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thus rendering any deterrent effect offered by the ethical rules a
practical nullity. 82
C. Illinois Proposals for Reform
In response to vociferous public outcry stemming from the many
recently publicized cases of wrongful conviction in Illinois, the Illinois
Supreme Court Committee on Capital Cases and former Governor
Ryan's Commission on Capital Punishment issued numerous proposals
to reform the state criminal justice system. 83  Among their many
recommendations, the Death Penalty Committee and the Governor's
Commission provided suggestions for ensuring prosecutorial adherence
to the Brady rule.
Several of these suggestions were incorporated into Illinois laws and
court rules. The revisions seek to educate prosecutors about their
disclosure duties and encourage them to "do justice. '84 For example, in
response to a committee proposal, the Illinois Supreme Court amended
Rule 3.8 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct to include the
declaration of the justice-seeking duties of prosecutors: 85 "The duty of
a public prosecutor or other government lawyer is to seek justice, not
82. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12,
1999, at NI; see also Edward M. Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial
Courtroom Misconduct in Illinois: Is It Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors? 19 LoY. U.
CHI. L.J. 39, 47 (1987) ("Disciplinary sanctions are rarely imposed against prosecutors.").
Professor Richard Rosen surveyed lawyer disciplinary bodies in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia and discovered a dearth of proceedings pursued against prosecutors for Brady
violations over the course of six years. Rosen, supra note 64, at 720-30 (finding only nine
disciplinary proceedings). Professor Lawrence Marshall attributes the disinclination to discipline
prosecutorial misconduct as tacit approval: "Many players in the system-judges, defense
lawyers, prosecutors-know some of the stuff that happens, but nonetheless tend to turn a blind
eye. There's a feeling that that is how it works, that it's legitimate to bend the truth sometimes
when you are doing it with 'the greater good' in mind." Armstrong & Possley, supra, at NI(quoting Professor Marshall). But see Armstrong & Possley, supra note 61, at Cl (describing
charges brought against Cook County law enforcement officials for conspiring to frame defendant
for murder of ten-year-old girl by, inter alia, concealing exculpatory evidence). Though
ultimately acquitted, the law enforcement officers called the "DuPage 7" were brought to trial.
Christy Gutowski, Indictment Hovering Over Sad Anniversary, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Feb. 26,
2005, at 1.
83. See Mark R. Madler, Illinois Death Penalty Committee Issues Final Report:
Recommendations Made to State Supreme Court, American Lawyer Media, Nov. 3, 2000,
http://www.truthinjustice.org/illdpreport.htmi; Report of the Commission on Capital Punishment,
April 2002, http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission-report/index.htnil.
84. Several scholars have suggested similar solutions. See, e.g., Roberta K. Flowers, A Code
of Their Own: Updating the Ethics Codes to Include the Non-Adversarial Roles of Federal
Prosecutors, 37 B.C. L. REV. 923, 970-71 (1996) (suggesting general and specific rules
governing prosecutorial ethical behavior); Zacharias, supra note 74, at 110-12 (calling for greater
specificity in ethical rules for prosecutors).
85. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2001).
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merely to convict." 86 Likewise, the committee provided the impetus for
the addition of the government's duty to specifically identify
exculpatory or mitigating information in Illinois Supreme Court Rule
41287 and the directive to the state to ensure the flow of information
among investigative and prosecutorial personnel.88 With respect to the
Capital Punishment Commission, a recommendation regarding the
disclosure of information on informant witnesses in capital cases has
been codified in the state criminal procedure rules.89 Illinois legislators
also adopted a commission recommendation requiring investigative
agencies to provide all investigative material and exculpatory
information to the prosecution. 90
In addition to these recommendations, the Capital Punishment
Commission suggested that the Illinois Supreme Court assist
prosecutors in their Brady obligations by defining "exculpatory
evidence." 91 To this end, the Commission recommended the following
definition:
Exculpatory information includes, but may not be limited to, all
information that is material and favorable to the defendant because it
tends to: (1) Cast doubt on defendant's guilt as to any essential
element in any count in the indictment or information; (2) Cast doubt
on the admissibility of evidence that the state anticipates offering in its
case-in-chief that might be subject to a motion to suppress or exclude;
(3) Cast doubt on the credibility or accuracy of any evidence that the
state anticipates offering in its case-in-chief; or (4) Diminish the
86. ILL. RULES OFPROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2001).
87. See ILL. SuP. CT. R. 412 cmt. (2001). The amended provision reads: "[T]he State shall
disclose to defense counsel any material or information within its possession or control which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or which would tend to reduce
his punishment therefor." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(c).
88. See ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412 cmt. The amended provision reads: "The State should ensure
that a flow of information is maintained between the various investigative personnel and its office
sufficient to place within its possession or control all material and information relevant to the
accused and the offense charged." ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(f).
89. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-21 (2004). This statute establishes the prosecution's duty to
timely disclose information about informant witnesses such as the informant's complete criminal
history, any inducement offered or to be offered to the informant, and any information that bears
relevance to the informant's credibility. Id. See also RYAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1,
at 120-21 (recommendations 50-51).
90. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/114-13 (2004). Newly enacted section 5/114-13(b) explicitly
obligates investigative agencies to provide to the prosecutor all exculpatory materials,
documented or otherwise, associated with an investigation generated or possessed by the agency
and requires these agencies to adopt policies to ensure compliance with the statute. Id. See also
RYAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 40-41 (recommendation 16).
91. RYAN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 119-20. The Illinois Supreme Court has yet
to adopt this recommendation.
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degree of the defendant's culpability or mitigate the defendant's
potential sentence.
92
The Commission also recommended that the state legislature clearly
describe police duties "to pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry,"
including those that point away from an identified suspect,93 and to
document all evidence, including exculpatory evidence.94  The former
proposal was designed to combat tunnel vision and confirmatory bias in
policing, which may lead investigating officers to focus exclusively on a
particular suspect and prevent them from objectively evaluating whether
other individuals are potentially guilty.95 The latter proposal calls for
the police to keep schedules listing all relevant evidence and to provide
copies of the schedules to the prosecutor.96  The Commission also
suggested that a specific law enforcement employee be responsible for
maintaining these records97 and that the legislature expressly require the
police to "give the prosecutor access to all investigatory materials in
their possession." 9
8
II. THE UK DISCLOSURE EXPERIENCE
In considering the Illinois experience, there are valuable lessons to be
learned from the United Kingdom, where defective pretrial disclosure
also contributed to a series of notorious miscarriages of justice.99  In
92. Id. at 119. This definition was drawn from the Local Criminal Rules for the Federal
District Court in Massachusetts. Id. at 120.
93. Id. at 20 (recommendation 1). This recommendation is based on provisions of the British
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. Id. The Illinois legislature has not adopted this
recommendation.
94. Id. at 22 (recommendation 2). This recommendation is also based on provisions of the
British Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996. Id. The Illinois legislature has yet to
adopt this recommendation.
95. Id. at 20-21 (comments to recommendation 1).
96. Id. at 22 (recommendation 2).
97. Id. Under the proposal, the designated record-keeper must certify her compliance in
writing to the prosecution. Id.
98. Id.
99. A far from exhaustive list includes, Unreliability of Police Evidence Quashes Convictions,
THE TIMES (LONDON), Oct. 20, 1989, at Issue 63530 (discussing R v. Richardson); R v.
McIlkenny, (1991) 93 Crim. App. 287; R v. Maguire (1992) Q.B. 936; R v. Taylor (1994) 98
Crim. App. 361. Most of these cases arose from the IRA bombing campaigns of the 1970s, but
perhaps the clearest example of both the importance of the disclosure process and the disastrous
consequences of its failure is R v. Kiszko. Michael Horsnell, "Wrong Man" Jailed for 1975
Killing, THE TIMES (LONDON), Feb. 18, 1992. In the 1970s, Stefan Kiszko, a young, learning-
disabled man, was charged with the rape and murder of a young girl and documentary evidence of
his sterility (which rendered him incapable of producing the DNA evidence found at the scene)
was known to the prosecution, but was not disclosed to the defense. Id. Consequently, Kiszko
was convicted and served sixteen years in prison before the documents came to light and his
conviction was quashed. Id. He died shortly after his release. Id.
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many of these cases, had the United Kingdom retained capital
punishment, it is almost certain that such sentences would have been
imposed.
The law of disclosure in the United Kingdom initially developed
through the common law. Alarm at the failings of the system, however,
coupled with concern from police and prosecutors at the ever-expanding
scope of the disclosure obligations, culminated in the passage of the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.00 The Act imposed
more stringent disclosure obligations on police and prosecutors, but
also, for the first time, imposed a reciprocal duty of disclosure on the
defense, thereby reinforcing the inequality of bargaining power between
the state and the accused. 10 1  Unfortunately, the imposition of a
statutory disclosure regime has done little to prevent further
miscarriages of justice in the United Kingdom.
A. The Development of Disclosure in the United Kingdom
Although the principle of disclosure is well established in the United
Kingdom, 10 2 there have been concerns for many years over the
application of the common law procedures. 10 3  With the issue of the
Attorney General's Guidelines for the Disclosure of 'Unused Material'
100. Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act, 1996, c. 25 (Eng.).
101. This was very much in keeping with a series of provisions introduced in the mid-1990s
by a conservative government that was heavily influenced by the "law and order" agenda. At the
same time as the CPIA forced the defense to reveal its case by means of advance disclosure, the
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 criminalized various forms of public protest and
freedom of expression and also abrogated the right against self-incrimination by permitting the
court to draw adverse inference when a defendant remains silent or refuses to testify. Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, §§ 34-37 (Eng.). The weapon of adverse inference is
also used to compel defense disclosure under § 11 of the CPIA.
102. See generally JOHN NIBLETT, DISCLOSURE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (1997)
(describing the history of English disclosure law). For a general overview of the disclosure
regime see Mike Redmayne, Criminal Justice Act 2003: (1) Disclosure and its Discontents, 2004
Crim. L.R. 441; David Ormerod, Improving the Disclosure Regime, 7 INT'L J. EVIDENCE &
PROOF 102 (2003); Chris Taylor, Advance Disclosure: Reflections on the Criminal Procedure
and Investigations Act 1996, HOWARD J. CRIM. JUST. 114 (2001).
103. See, e.g., Doreen McBarnet, The Fisher Report on the Confait Case: Four Issues, 41
MODERN L.R. 455 (1978) (discussing the inquiry into the Confait case, in which three boys were
wrongfully convicted of murder and arson based on a faulty investigation). The Fisher Report
was forthright in its criticism of the existing practices, and its concerns were reiterated by the
courts in R v. Leyland Magistrates, ex parte Hawthorn, [1979] Q.B. 283, which held non-
disclosure by the prosecutor of potentially exculpatory evidence to be a denial of natural justice
sufficient to warrant overturning a conviction. See also R v. Hassan and Kotaish, (1968) 52
Crim. App. 291. Ultimately, the matter was referred to the Royal Commission on Criminal
Procedure, which called for disclosure of all non-sensitive witness statements. ROYAL
COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, REPORT, 1981, Cm. 8092, at para. 8.19 [hereinafter
1981 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT]. It concluded that, in matters of disclosure, discretion should
lie with the prosecutor. Id.
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to the Defence 10 4 in 1982, police and prosecutors received more
structured guidance on the precise scope of their duties in relation to
disclosure. The Guidelines introduced the term "unused material"1 °5
into the vocabulary of the criminal justice system and provided that
such material is subject to disclosure when "it has some bearing on the
offence(s) charged and the subsequent circumstances of the case."
10 6
Despite its apparent simplicity, however, subsequent events showed just
how broadly this rule of instruction could be interpreted. 10 7 Also, the
fact that the Guidelines did not entirely replace the common law rules
on disclosure sparked confusion over their precise legal status. Dispute
as to whether they enjoyed the full force of law108 or whether they were
merely advisory10 9 was finally resolved in 1995 when the Court of
Appeal approved the latter interpretation.' 10 Nonetheless, the courts
continued to progressively expand the remit of the prosecution
disclosure obligation. By 1989, the scope of "unused material," as
defined in R v. Saunders and Others No.],111 was broad in the extreme:
"[I]t is clear the term 'unused material' may apply to virtually all
material collected during the investigation of a case."
' 112
Clearly, this inclusive interpretation could encompass any material
that had, or might have, some bearing on the offense charged and the
surrounding circumstances of the case. Even more far-reaching was the
statement that the relevance of any unused material was to be decided
not by the police or prosecution, but by the defense. The inevitable
consequence was a fundamental reappraisal of the scope of the existing
104. (1982) 74 Crim. App. R. 302.
105. Although this term clearly included statements (including drafts) that did not form part of
the committal bundles (statements and documentary exhibits used by the prosecution to determine
whether to proceed with a case) served on the defense, the Guidelines were less helpful in
identifying precisely which other categories of material might fall within the category and so
qualify for disclosure.
106. 1981 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 103, at para. 2.
107. See, e.g., R v. Livingstone, [1993] Crim. L.R. 597 CA ("It is the duty of the prosecution
in all cases where material, whether documentary or otherwise, which is of relevance to the
defence comes into their hands to make the defence a present of such material."). Over time, the
categories of unused material subject to disclosure expanded to encompass virtually all potential
forms of evidence as in R v. Ward, (1993) 96 Crim. App. 1. It was this process of expansion that
led to calls for restriction of the prosecution duty and so provided the impetus for passage of the
CPIA.
108. Lord Runciman, chair of the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, concluded that they
"to all intents and purposes have the force of law." ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
REPORT, 1993, Cm. 2263, 91 n.20 [hereinafter 1993 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT].
109. In re Barlow Clowes, Ltd., [1992] Ch. 208.
110. R v. Brown, (Winston) [1995] 1 Crim. App. 191.
111. (unreported) Central Criminal Court, 29th September 1989, Transcript T881630.
112. Id.
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provisions. However, when the Attorney General declined to redraft the
Guidelines, 113 the task of providing guidance for prosecutors and the
police fell, instead, to the Director of Public Prosecutions. The result
was the "Guinness Advice," issued in 1992, which instructed the police
to catalog all materials generated during an investigation, while leaving
decisions regarding disclosure to the Crown Prosecution Service
(CPS). 114 The police reaction was largely negative, partly due to the
time expended meeting defense requests for material, but mainly
because, in reality, control of what material was disclosed lay not with
the police or CPS, but with the defense. Consequently, the defense
routinely demanded copies of all unused material, relevant or not,
thereby imposing enormous logistical pressures on the police in relation
to the copying of documents, interview tapes, closed-circuit television,
and other investigatory items. 115
The new regime was barely in place when the Court of Appeal
delivered another blow to the Attorney General's Guidelines in
upholding the appeal of Judith Ward in R v. Ward.1 16 The court was
severely critical of the prosecution's failure to disclose a mass of
conflicting evidence that undermined the Crown's case and concluded:
"[T]hose who prepare and conduct prosecutions owe a duty to the
Courts to ensure that all relevant evidence of help to an accused is either
led by them or made available to the defence."1 17 What is more, in the
113. 202 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (1992) 39.
114. This was accompanied by the Association of Chief Police Offices and Crown
Prosecution Service Joint Operational Instructions for the Disclosure of Unused Material (1997)
(unpublished), a key aspect of which was the introduction of standard forms for use by the police
as part of file preparation. The schedules MG6C (non-sensitive unused material) and MG6D
(sensitive unused material) record all the unused material generated during the inquiry and are
passed to the Crown Prosecution Service who would then provide the defense with copies of the
MG6C. The defense was then entitled not only to inspect the non-sensitive listed documents, but
also to have them copied at prosecution expense. As with later changes to the disclosure regime,
the system was introduced with minimal training. Id.
115. However, in R v. Bromley Magistrates' Court ex parte Smith and Another, [1995] 1
W.L.R. 944 (Q.B.D.), the court, in extending disclosure to summary cases, also approved the
police policy of refusing to copy materials for the defense unless a defense representative had
inspected the documents at the police station and identified them as being relevant to the case.
See also R v South Worcestershire Justices ex parte Lilley, [1996] 1 Crim. App. 420 (Q.B.D.)
(regarding non-disclosure of unused material when public interest immunity is claimed).
116. (1993), 96 Crim. App. 1. Ward was wrongfully convicted of several fatal IRA bombings
pursuant to the suppression of numerous items of exculpatory material by the police (in
particular, contradictory forensic evidence and psychological reports indicating that the Judith
Ward was prone toward confessing to offenses that she had not, in fact, committed). She was
released from prison after serving eighteen years. See NIBLETr, supra note 102, at 1-3, 74-77,
115-16.
117. Ward, 96 Crim. App. at 25 (quoting Lawton LJ in R v. Hennessey, (1979) 68 Crim. App.
419,426).
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process of reprimanding the prosecution, the court looked to the
definition of unused material given in R v. Hennessey1 18 in describing
the scope of "relevant evidence":
We would emphasise that "all relevant evidence of help to the
accused" is not limited to evidence which will obviously advance the
accused's case. It is of help to the accused to have the opportunity of
considering all the material evidence which the prosecution have
gathered, and from which the prosecution have made their own
selection of evidence to be led.1 19
In other words, the defense was to have access to all material collected
by the prosecution, irrespective of its relevance to the case and any costs
incurred by the prosecution in granting this access.
At the same time as the courts grappled with the precise nature and
extent of the duty of disclosure as defined in Ward, the subject was also
under scrutiny from another quarter. The Royal Commission on
Criminal Justice had been appointed to consider the operation of the
entire criminal justice system in the wake of a string of damaging
miscarriages of justice, most of which involved defective disclosure by
the prosecution. 120  For this reason, it was anticipated that the
Commission would recommend even greater disclosure to the defense.
The tone of the Commission's final report,121 however, demonstrated
far more sympathy with the police perspective on disclosure than with
the defense: "IT]he defence can require the police and prosecution to
comb through large masses of material in the hope either of causing
delay or of chancing upon something that will induce the prosecution to
drop the case rather than have to disclose the material concerned."' 122
The import of this finding was clear. The Commission concluded
that the purpose of defense requests for disclosure was not to secure
relevant information, but to subvert the prosecution process-a position
made all the more iniquitous by the absence of any comparable
obligation on the defense to reveal information in its possession to the
prosecution. 123 For this reason, the Commission was prepared to take
118. (1979), 68 Crim. App. 419.
119. Ward, 96 Crim. App. at 25.
120. This inquiry was announced on the day that the appeals of the Birmingham Six, a case
involving one of the worst miscarriages of justice in the history of the modern-day UK legal
system, were allowed. The Birmingham Six were six men wrongfully convicted for two IRA pub
bombings that killed twenty-one people. Sixteen years after their conviction, they were released
from prison after evidence of police fabrication and suppression of evidence during their trial was
unearthed. R v. McIlkenny and Others, (1991) 93 Crim. App. 287.
121. 1993 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 108, at para. 42.
122. Id.
123. Nevertheless, the informal practice had evolved of the prosecution providing the defense
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the radical step of recommending a reciprocal, albeit more limited, duty
on the part of the defense "to disclose the substance of their defence in
advance of the trial." 124 The result was a fundamental shift of power
back to the police and prosecution in determining what, if any,
information should be revealed to the defense. 125 Unsurprisingly, this
pronouncement was met with enthusiasm by a conservative government
that was eager to demonstrate its commitment to a "law and order"
agenda. When it came, the government's response went even further
than the Commission's recommendations, particularly in relation to the
proposals for a duty of defense disclosure. 126 The end product was the
Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996.127
B. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996
The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996 fundamentally
changed the conduct of criminal cases. In particular, it introduced a
three-stage disclosure procedure. The new process replaced the
previous system of largely automatic disclosure by the prosecution with
a new system that recognized that the prosecution would routinely
withhold certain material. Pursuant to the CPIA, the prosecution is
required to disclose material to the defense only when the material in
question first satisfies the test of "relevance" imposed by the Act:
[M]aterial may be relevant to the investigation if it appears to an
investigator, or to the officer in charge of the investigation, or to the
disclosure officer, that it has some bearing on any offence under
investigation or any person being investigated, or to the surrounding
with a letter outlining the issues that had influenced the prosecution's disclosure decisions and
inviting the defense to comment and outline its position.
124. 1993 ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 108, at para. 66.
125. The potential dangers of this were recognized from the outset: "[w]e cannot see how any
system can conclusively guarantee that the investigator will not bury such evidence if the defence
are unaware of it." LEONARD H. LEIGH & LUCIA ZEDNER, THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, A REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE PRE-
TRIAL PHASE IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 73 (London, HMSO 1992).
126. HOME OFFICE, DISCLOSURE: A CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, 1995, Cm. 2864. More
fundamental, however, were concerns over the role of defense disclosure as a trigger for further
disclosure by the prosecution which, it was feared, would restrict the scope of the defense case at
trial as well as allow the prosecution to seek to justify withholding material on the grounds that its
relevance was to a line of defense other than that contained in the defense statement. The
Government openly acknowledged this point when seeking to restrict the common law duty of
disclosure: "[t]he current law requires the prosecutor to disclose to the accused anything which
might possibly be relevant to an issue at the trial, whether or not it has any bearing on the defence
which the accused relies on at trial." 567 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1959) 463 (emphasis
added).
127. The CPIA came into force on April 1, 1997.
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circumstances of the case, unless it is incapable of having any impact
on the case.
12 8
Under the CPIA, each investigation has a nominated "disclosure
officer," who is responsible for satisfying the requirements of the Act
relating to the collation and disclosure of unused material. 129 The most
crucial aspect of this post is the officer's preparation of the schedules
listing unused material that form the basis for all subsequent
disclosure. 130 Although the wording of the Act suggests that the work
of the disclosure officer bears a supervisory role with respect to the
work of the officer in the case (OIC), in the overwhelming majority of
cases, the same individual performs both roles. This is problematic for
two reasons: first, it produces a potential conflict of interest for the
officer concerned; second, an investigator who makes an error in
assessing material for disclosure is hardly likely to correct that error by
revisiting the decision as the disclosure officer. From the disclosure
officer, the file is passed to the Crown Prosecution Service, and,
ultimately, it falls to the CPS lawyer to fulfill the prosecution
responsibilities set out under the Act.
Although the Act has undergone significant changes in the past
year, 13 1 in its original form, the threefold disclosure procedure
established by the CPIA begins with the primary disclosure stage,
during which the prosecution must:
(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not
previously been disclosed to the accused and which in the prosecutor's
opinion might undermine the case for the prosecution against the
accused, or
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material
of a description mentioned in paragraph (a). 132
The term "material" covers anything:
128. Draft Codes of Practice § 2:1. The disclosure obligations under the CPIA apply once the
accused is sent to Crown Court for trial on indictment, CPIA at § 1(2), and voluntarily appears
before the magistrates' court. Id. at § 6. The Act imposes no disclosure obligations prior to
charge. DPP ex parte Lee, [1999] 2 Crim. App. 304 (Q.B.D.). But see DPP v. Ara, [2002] 1
Crim. App. 16, 165 (stating that, in relation to a suspect's right to disclosure of his police
interview record, "[t]he question of whether or not a defendant should accept a caution is
inextricably linked with his entitlement . . to legal advice and to the necessary prerequisite for
informed legal advice, that those advising know accurately the terms of the interview on the basis
of which the police are prepared to issue a caution.")
129. Draft Codes of Practice §§ 3.1-3.6.
130. Id. at §§ 7.1-7.5.
131. See infra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (discussing amendments to the 1996
statute).
132. CPIA at § 3(1). The duty is subject to the provisions for "protected material" in sexual
cases under the Sexual Offences (Protected Material) Act 1997.
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(a) which is in the prosecutor's possession, and came into his
possession in connection with the case for the prosecution against the
accused, or
(b) which, in pursuance of a code operative under Part H1, he has
inspected in connection with the case for the prosecution against the
accused. 13
3
Notably, the individual prosecutor 134  must make a subjective
assessment of the possible impact of the material on the prosecution's
case based on the schedules prepared by the disclosure officer. 135 The
non-sensitive schedule is then passed to the defense and, with it, the
duty of disclosure.
Under the original 1996 Act, the defense is required to produce a
detailed statement:
(a) setting out in general terms the nature of the accused's defence,
(b) indicating the matters on which he takes issue with the
prosecution, and
(c) setting out, in the case of each such matter, the reason why he
takes issue with the prosecution. 136
The defense statement is to be served on the prosecution within
fourteen days of primary disclosure 137 and prompts a reexamination of
the unused material by the prosecution. This third step in the disclosure
process is undertaken not by reference to the initial subjective test of
primary disclosure, but, instead, by means of an objective assessment of
the remaining unused material, 138 whereby the prosecutor must:
133. Id. at § 3(2). Subsequent case law has established that the words "in connection with the
case for the prosecution against the accused" are to be broadly construed. R v. Reid, [2002]
Crim. L.R. 234.
134. Materiality is not dependent on the admissibility of the evidence. R v. Preston, [1994] 98
Crim. App. 405, 429 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). On issues of materiality, the
intervention of the court is reserved for matters of non-disclosure on grounds of Public Interest
Immunity. R v. B., [2000] Crim. L.R. 50 CA. It is also open to the defense in common law to
seek the assistance of the court in determining issues of materiality, although even this requires
the defense to establish a clear prima facie case for opposing the prosecutor's view. R v. Bromiey
Justices exparte Smith and Wilkins, [1995] 2 Crim. App. 285, 291 (Q.B.D.).
135. In a similar vein, the test of relevance is also based on the opinion of the investigator.
See supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text (discussing the investigator's role in determining
relevance).
136. CPIA § 5(6).
137. This time period is subject to extension. The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996 (Defence Disclosure Time Limits) Regulations, 1997, S.I. 1997/684, reg. 2 and extension
reg. 3(2).
138. Critics have assailed the use of separate tests during the primary and secondary stages of
disclosure as being "logically indefensible, confusing and the cause of much unnecessary pre-trial
dispute and delay." R. L.J. AULD, A REVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS OF ENGLAND AND
WALES, ch. 10, at para. 1 & 2 (London, HMSO 2001).
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(a) disclose to the accused any prosecution material which has not
previously been disclosed to the accused and which might be
reasonably expected to assist the accused's defence as disclosed by the
defence statement given under section 5 or 6, or
(b) give to the accused a written statement that there is no material
of a description mentioned in paragraph (a). 139
The purpose of requiring the prosecution to revisit its initial
assessment of the unused material in the case is to provide additional
protection for the accused without reverting to the previous regime
under the Attorney General's Guidelines, which often required the
police to provide copies of all material in their possession. The
procedure under the CPIA, however, depends entirely on the defense
statement to indicate the proposed character of the defense and identify
material that may undermine the prosecution's case.
140
Despite the various amendments that have followed, the CPIA
remains a procedure that leaves discretion in matters of disclosure to the
prosecution, with only limited safeguards for the accused. Even the
penalties for noncompliance or inadequate disclosure are unequal, as the
1996 Act provides no sanction for the prosecution beyond the granting
of an order by the court compelling additional disclosure.
141
Furthermore, the procedure for obtaining additional prosecution
material places the burden on the defense to show "reasonable cause to
believe that there is prosecution material which might be reasonably
expected to assist the defence," 142 thereby raising the question of to
what extent the defense is equipped to identify such material when both
the defense and the court may be ignorant of its existence.
1 43
139. CPIA § 7(2).
140. Id. at § 7(2)(a). The prosecutor is required only to disclose that "which might be
reasonably expected to assist the accused's defence as disclosed by the defence statement." Id.
(emphasis added).
141. This is in contrast to the power to draw "adverse inference" following a defense failure to
comply with the disclosure provisions. Id. at § 11.
142. Id. at § 8(2)(a).
143. As one observer states:
Though the defence may apply to the court to order the disclosure of material held by
the police, it first has to show how this helps its particular case. Without seeing it, the
defence may not know how it is relevant and unless it can show its relevance will not
be allowed to see it.
Roger Ede, In the Name of Justice, TIMES (LONDON), Apr. 1, 1997, at 33.
So-called "fishing expeditions" were again discouraged in R v. Brown (Winston), [1995] 1 Crim.
App. 191 CA and R v. Guney, [1998] 2 Crim. App. 242.
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C. CPIA Disclosure
Since its inception, the 1996 Act has accumulated a somewhat
troubled history 144 and attracted widespread concern. After eight years
of CPIA disclosure, it is clear that the statutory disclosure regime is not
working. All of the extant research 145 has highlighted numerous
structural failings in the operation of disclosure that continues to
produce miscarriages of justice. For example, a government study of
disclosure revealed that "the CP[I]A is not at present working as
Parliament intended; nor does its present operation command the
confidence of criminal practitioners .... [I]n a significant proportion of
contested cases CPS compliance with CPIA procedures is defective in
one or more respects." 146  These disclosure deficiencies have raised
doubts among criminal practitioners about the quality of disclosure 1
4 7
and "have led to a lack of trust in the comprehensiveness and accuracy
of the schedules of non-sensitive and sensitive material provided by the
144. From the outset, there were concerns over the provisions as they progressed through
Parliament. As an example, the Bill arrived for consideration with 102 government amendments
having been tabled in a single day, leading to much criticism: "In some 25 years of parliamentary
life I can remember no occasion on which a Bill that was not urgent has come forward so ill
prepared and so carelessly drafted . . . The truth is that the Bill has been rushed forward in a
most extraordinary way." 567 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (1995) 1408.
145. For a discussion of these structural failures, see Law Society (1999) CPIA 1996
Disclosure Provisions Survey; JOYCE PLOTNIKOFF & RICHARD WOOLFSON, 'A FAIR BALANCE'?
EVALUATION OF THE OPERATION OF DISCLOSURE LAW (2001); R. L.J. AULD, A REVIEW OF THE
CRIMINAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES, FINAL REPORT (2001).
146. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE INSPECTORATE, REPORT ON THE THEMATIC REVIEW OF
THE DISCLOSURE OF UNUSED MATERIAL, 2000, at para. 1.6.
147. Id. at para. 3.38. According to the report:
Criminal practitioners outside the prosecution ... expressed almost universal lack of
faith that the system is working satisfactorily. There were doubts about the consistent
quality of investigations and the capturing, recording or following up of relevant
matters. There were doubts about the quality of consultation and communication
between the officer in charge of the investigation and others involved in a particular
investigation There were doubts about the priority given to the task by the
nominated disclosure officer and about the suitability of some disclosure officers.
Id. In addition, in a survey of criminal barristers in the UK conducted by the Criminal Bar
Association, 83% of respondents felt that police schedules of unused material were likely to be
unreliable, 90% felt that there was no reliable method of independent scrutiny of the disclosure
procedures and 84% concluded that CPIA as a whole was, "either not working well or working
badly." British Academy of Forensic Sciences and the Criminal Bar Association (1999) Survey
of the Practising Independent Bar into the Operation in Practice of the Criminal Procedure and
Investigations Act 1996 Disclosure Provisions. Another study commissioned by the Home Office
found that, of those surveyed, nearly 60% of barristers, 72% of defense barristers, 50% of defense
solicitors, and 15% of judges believed that non-sensitive unused material that should have been
disclosed to the defense was frequently not so disclosed. PLOTNIKOFF & WOOLFSON, supra note
145, at 71.
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disclosure officer to the prosecutor."' 148 The study also noted concerns
about the overall ability of investigating and disclosure officers to
perform their duties under the CPIA. 1
49
The continuing failings of CPIA disclosure are dramatically
illustrated by the "London City Bond" cases, which developed from a
protracted investigation by HM Customs and Excise (HMCE) into the
evasion of excise duty by customers of the London City Bond
Warehouse in the late 1990s. The fraud related to alcohol, which could
be bought and sold between dealers within the network of bonded
warehouses without incurring any tax. The tax became payable once
the alcohol was released for sale into the domestic market; therefore, if
the goods were simply bound for another bonded warehouse then no tax
was paid. By falsifying documentation that suggested that the goods
were being transferred from one bonded warehouse to another, it was
possible for fraudsters to remove the alcohol from the warehouse
without paying tax in order to sell it on the open market at an enormous
profit. Due to the controls in place within the bonded warehouse
system, such frauds are difficult to conceal from the warehouse
management and this led to senior staff within the London City Bond
Warehouse notifying HMCE officials of the existence of large scale
fraud on the part of some of their customers. Rather than arrest the
rogue traders immediately, HMCE investigators elected to allow the
crimes to continue in order to increase the sums involved and so be seen
to solve a larger fraud. This was achieved with the assistance of
informants who worked at the warehouse. However, because of the
active encouragement of the offences by investigators, the existence of
the informants was not disclosed to the defense. 150 More egregiously,
this information was concealed not only from the defense but also from
the court, 151 thus fatally undermining the convictions attained by the
148. CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE INSPECTORATE, REPORT ON THE THEMATIC REVIEW OF
THE DISCLOSURE OF UNUSED MATERIAL, 2000, at para. 3.39.
149. Id.
150. J. BUTTERFIELD, REVIEW OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS
CONDUCTED BY HM CUSTOMS AND EXCISE ch. 4 (2003).
151. Id. Although the role of informants is routinely concealed from the defense under the
doctrine of 'public interest immunity' (PH), it is an essential aspect of the process that the court is
fully apprised of any such sensitive material in order to determine whether it should be disclosed.
The principles on which such issues are determined are well established, see R v. Davis, Rowe
and Johnson [1993] 1 W.L.R. 613 (discussing the use of PH to justify non-disclosure) and R v.
Keane, [19941 1 W.L.R. 746 (discussing the judge's role in conducting a "balancing exercise"
regarding non-disclosure), although the procedure has recently been reviewed by the House of
Lords in R v. H and C, [2004] UKHL 3. For an overview of the law of public interest immunity
see, Chris Taylor, What Next for Public Interest Immunity?, 69 J. CRIM. L. 75 (2005). An
additional consideration is that the UK is subject to Article 6.3 of the European Convention on
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prosecution. The end result was a series of prosecutions that were, by
any objective standard, disastrous, with the collapse of thirteen separate
trials involving a total of 109 defendants and an estimated total fraud of
£668 million. 152  By the conclusion of the proceedings, all appeals
against conviction (even those following a guilty plea) had been
successful. 153 In addition, following lengthy abuse of process hearings,
the prosecution offered no evidence against the forty defendants who
were yet to stand trial or in respect of whom retrials had previously been
ordered. 154
The conclusions of the subsequent government inquiry are indicative
of the tenor of the criticism directed at the disclosure debacle:
[C]ourts were misled . . . Judges were not told by counsel, who
themselves had been misled, that there were other undocumented
contacts with the informant. If the nature and extent of the missing
contacts had been known to counsel and disclosed to the judges
concerned it is at least possible and in some cases likely that a
different conclusion would have been reached . . . and with it the
question of whether to proceed in respect of certain of the
prosecutions. 155
[The Court of Appeal] ... was prepared to make express findings that
HMCE officers had lied. . and that the lies were told by reason of a
deliberate decision on the part of HMCE to conceal from the judge the
Human Rights, which provides that everyone charged with a criminal offence is entitled, "to be
informed promptly, in a language which he understands and in detail, of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him," and "to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to
obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him." EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, Council of Europe, Rome,
Nov. 4, 1950, Art 6(3)(a) & (d). This causes particular problems in relation to PIH hearings, and
the UK has fallen afoul of the European Court of Human Rights on a number of occasions.
Edwards v. United Kingdom, (1992) 15 E.H.R.R. 417; Rowe and Davis v. United Kingdom,
(2000) 30 E.H.R.R. 1; Edwards and Lewis v. United Kingdom, 22 July 2003, Application Nos.
39647/98 and 40461/98. For further discussion of the issues raised by these cases, see B.
Emmerson, The CPIA and the Human Rights Act-Compatibility PII and the Human Rights Act,
in DISCLOSURE UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATIONS ACT 1996 (conference
papers) (British Academy of Forensic Sciences (BAFS) 1999); S. Sharpe, Human Rights Act
1998: Art 6 and the Disclosure of Evidence in Criminal Trials, [1999] Crim. L.R. 273; John
Wadham, Prosecution Disclosure, Crime and Human Rights, 147 NEw L.J. 697 (1997).
152. BUTrERFIELD, supra note 150, at para. 8.36.
153. See R v. Patel and Others, [2001] EWCA Crim. 2505 (quashing the convictions of five
appellants, including one who pled guilty at trial); R v. Early, [2002] EWCA Crim. 1904
(quashing the "unsafe" convictions of eight appellants); R v. Mcllfatrick [2005] EWCA Crim.
693 (overturning appellant's "tainted" conviction).
154. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 150, at para. 8.39.
155. Id. atpara. 8.16.
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true status of [the informant] and the real nature of the relationship
between HMCE and London City Bond.
156
Such cases have done little to dispel the prevalent belief that the
CPIA provisions are commonly misapplied and misunderstood, and
confidence in the disclosure regime remains fragile. Three years after
the CPIA was implemented, fresh Attorney General's Guidelines were
issued in an attempt to clarify the obligations of both police and
prosecutors, and to address the inconsistent practices of both police and
prosecutors across the United Kingdom. 157  However, it became clear
that more fundamental changes were required and so, in April 2005,
sections of the Criminal Justice Act 2003158 came into force, making
two important and related amendments to the 1996 statute. First, at the
primary disclosure stage, the phrase, "in the prosecutor's opinion might
undermine" is replaced by, "might reasonably be considered capable of
undermining." 159 Second, the 2003 Act creates a continuing duty to
disclose on the part of the prosecutor. 160 The combined effect of these
provisions is not only to remove the subjective test for disclosure that
previously existed in relation to initial disclosure, but also to abolish the
distinction between "primary" and "secondary" disclosure, creating
instead a single ongoing duty on the part of the prosecution.
161
Crucially, however, the primary responsibility for ensuring that all
relevant exculpatory material is disclosed to the defense remains with
the disclosure officer who continues to work with a minimum of
training and supervision.
156. Id. atpara. 9.64.
157. See THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE, THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE ANNUAL
REPORT 2000-2001 (2001), http://cps.gov.uk/publications/reports/annualreport01 .html.
158. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c.44 §§ 32-40 (Eng.).
159. Id. at § 32(a).
160. Pursuant to the new § 7(A) of the CPIA:
(2) The prosecutor must keep under review the question whether at any given time
(and, in particular, following the giving of a defence statement) there is prosecution
material which-
(a) might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution
against the accused or of assisting the case for the accused, and
(b) has not been disclosed to the accused.
(3) If at any time there is any such material as is mentioned in subsection (2) the
prosecutor must disclose it to the accused as soon as is reasonably practicable (or
within the period mentioned in subsection (5)(a), where that applies).
Id. at § 37.
161. This prompted yet another set of Attorney General's Guidelines. See Attorney General's
Guidelines on Disclosure (updated April 2005) available at http://www.attomeygeneral.gov.uk/
attachments/disclosure.doc (last visited Mar. 17, 2007). For an excellent summary of the
amendments to the CPIA, see RICHARD TAYLOR, MARTIN WASIK & ROGER LENG,
BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 2003 35-50 (2004).
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III. UK LESSONS FOR ILLINOIS DISCLOSURE
A. Lessons Learned
An examination of the UK disclosure experience reveals many
potential learning points for Illinois and other states that wish to address
problems surrounding the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. A side-
by-side inspection shows obvious similarities-both Illinois and the
United Kingdom require the disclosure of exculpatory and mitigating
evidence to the accused as part and parcel to an adversarial criminal
justice system, 162 but neither has been particularly successful at
enforcing this mandate. In addition, both have adopted reforms in the
aftermath of highly publicized governmental failures to hew to the duty
to disclose. Whereas Illinois has sought to shore up deficiencies in the
practice of disclosure by reasserting and reaffirming the prosecutor's
duty to disclose throughout its procedural and professional rules, the
United Kingdom has attempted to strengthen its commitment to
disclosure by adopting a detailed system of discovery designed to guide
both police and prosecutors through the process and to ensure the
disclosure of evidence favorable to the defendant in a criminal case.
Although the reforms initiated are not identical, the differences are more
in degree than in kind. The revisions and amendments to both
discovery processes serve the same goals-to remind of (or reiterate)
and further define the existing disclosure duty.
A bird's-eye view of the two systems offers even more compelling
points of comparison. Over the past thirty years, the United Kingdom
has operated under three distinct systems regulating the disclosure of
exculpatory evidence to the accused: the common law system as applied
by the courts, the quasi-statutory system created by the Attorney
General's Guidelines, and the current statutory system of the CPIA. 16 3
The shifting sands of the UK approach reflect dissatisfaction with the
various methods of enforcing the disclosure obligation. When
disclosure violations erupted in a series of injustices, the informal
common law discovery structure gave way to increased regulation under
the Attorney General's Guidelines. 164  As disclosure continued to
present an intractable problem, the Guidelines, in turn, yielded to the
162. This is in contrast to the judge-controlled system of countries, like France, that employ
an inquisitorial system of justice. For information about the French system, see Renee Lettow
Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American Murder in the
French Cour D'Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791 (comparing differences in criminal procedure
between the United States and France).
163. See supra Part H.
164. See supra Part II.A.
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enactment of the CPIA. 165 All three systems evolved to give meaning
to the accused's fundamental right to disclosure in advance of trial, yet
all have foundered. 166
In Illinois, prosecutors safeguard the right of an accused to disclosure
of exculpatory evidence pursuant to the Brady doctrine, as developed by
the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts, along with
professional rules of conduct established by the Illinois Supreme
Court. 167 The shocking exposure of disclosure failures accompanying
the current crisis in the administration of the death penalty compelled
Illinois to reconsider its approach to enforcing the Brady rule. Faced
with increasing public pressure to ensure prosecutorial observance of
the constitutional duty, the Illinois Supreme Court reinforced mandatory
language in its professional rules, and the Illinois legislature codified
specific disclosure duties in capital cases. 168  In addition, state
policymakers continue to debate recommendations made by the Capital
Punishment Commission for further legislation addressing the
disclosure mandate. 169
From an evolutionary standpoint, Illinois appears to be on the brink
of, or perhaps is in the early stages of, a fundamental change in its
method of enforcing the duty to disclose-contemplating a move from
an era dominated by court doctrine and professional rules toward a
system of statutory enforcement. This alteration in approach parallels
earlier transformations in the United Kingdom. Certainly, if the Illinois
legislature were to give effect to the comprehensive array of
recommendations made by the Capital Punishment Commission, the
similarities between the Illinois and UK disclosure structures would
continue to grow in number as well as in kind. Considering that several
of the proposals bear a marked resemblance to disclosure duties
described in the CPIA, 170 increased legislative oversight could portend
165. See id.
166. See supra Part I.
167. See supra Part I.A.2.
168. See supra Part I.C.
169. Zimring, supra note 16, at 119 (noting that "most of the big-ticket items are still
being debated in the Illinois legislature").
170. For example, the Ryan Commission's recommendation of statutory duties for the police
to pursue all reasonable investigative leads matches CPIA provisions mandating that police take
"all reasonable steps.., for the purposes of the investigation," CPIA, 1996, ch. 25 § 23(l)(a), and
the Draft Codes' requirement that investigators "pursue all reasonable lines of inquiry, whether
these point towards or away from the suspect," Draft Codes of Practice, § 3.4. The Commission
also suggested that a disclosure officer be appointed for every criminal case and that the police be
required to create schedules documenting evidence and share these schedules with the
prosecution. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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a shift in the direction of the statutory regime currently in force in the
United Kingdom.
Given that Illinois is considering a path already well worn by the
United Kingdom, the UK disclosure experience is useful for evaluating
not only the latest changes to Illinois law but also the more aggressive
proposals that have yet to be adopted by the Illinois legislature. Every
criminal justice system faces an unpalatable decision in deciding how
rigorous to make the disclosure regime. Recent history in the United
Kingdom has shown that a wide-ranging disclosure obligation advances
the prosecutorial duty, but exacerbates investigations and creates
expense and delay. 17 1 Too narrow a disclosure duty reduces costs and
burdens for investigators and the prosecution, but risks further
miscarriages of justice. 172  In seeking to strike that elusive balance
between public pressure for a more robust criminal justice system and
the right of the accused to the disclosure by the government of
exculpatory or mitigating evidence, the United Kingdom tested three
distinct models of disclosure, but all three systems failed to remedy the
problems.
Why did these systems fail? The answer cannot be found in the
wording of the common law, Attorney General's Guidelines, or the
provisions of the CPIA. Instead, the answer is evident in the attitudes
and working practices of those charged with their implementation. The
UK experience has shown that subjecting investigators to a duty to
disclose exculpatory evidence creates, for many of them, an unenviable
conflict of interest. Tests for material to be disclosed are routinely
ignored and items are omitted from unused material schedules when
officers consider them to be either irrelevant or problematic. 173  The
basis of most, if not all, of these problems is the desire of the
investigator to secure a conviction, based on his or her personal belief in
the guilt of the suspect. 174 The approach adopted by the OIC toward the
171. See supra Part II.A.
172. See id.
173. For a detailed study of operational police practice in relation to disclosure, see CHRIS
TAYLOR, MAKING A CASE: THE CID, CASE CONSTRUCTION AND DISCLOSURE (2005).
174. This concept of the officer's certainty of guilt is a well-documented aspect of many
previous studies of operational police work. "Officers suppose that they have access to privileged
knowledge because they 'know' that the suspect is guilty and therefore accept some responsibility
for seeing that justice is done, even if that means helping the evidence along a little.'" SIMON
HOLDAWAY, INSIDE THE BRITISH POLICE 112 (1983). This paternalistic approach to the criminal
justice system is frequently expressed by police officers and lies at the root of much so-called
"noble cause corruption." As articulated by one Chief Inspector, "[t]he feeling is that the rules of
evidence are weighted [against the prosecution] and need help. There's the honest belief that the
fellow is guilty and the law needs a bit of help to ensure the right result is achieved." JAMES
MORTON, BENT COPPERS 275 (1993). "The adversary system itself molds a context for the
2007]
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investigation, together with the discretion exercised at all stages of the
inquiry, allows the final case file to be shaped in a way that limits the
potential challenges posed by any unused material so as to emphasize
those aspects of the case most favorable to the prosecution. 17
5
The 1996 Act, in particular, creates a fundamental conflict for the
police because, while officers are required to conduct their
investigations with all diligence, they must also actively seek out and
disclose information that assists the defense. Inevitably, many officers
regard this as undermining their work by reducing the chances of
achieving what they see as their primary objective of securing a
conviction, 176 leading to the common perception that, by providing
adequate disclosure, the police are "doing the defense's job for them."
The CPIA is predicated on the modem role of the police officer, as a
discretionary decision ... [t]he great benefit is to win; the great cost is to lose ... [d]iscretionary
actions made under this cost/benefit assumption will invariably tend toward presumption of guilt
in assessing the meaning of facts." Candace McCoy, Police, Prosecutors and Discretion in
Investigation, in HANDLED WITH DISCRETION: ETHICAL ISSUES IN POLICE DECISION MAKING
166 (John Kleinig ed., 1996). The potentially detrimental impact of such police preconceptions
has received attention in relation to the interviewing of suspects:
[T]heir minds are made up before the interview starts and, once on these tramlines,
they are not easily derailed. Denials are brushed aside and alternative perspectives and
explanations disregarded. . . the interviewer does not consider false confession in such
cases even as a remote possibility because the assumption of guilt is honestly held.
John Baldwin, Police Interviewing Techniques: Establishing Truth or Proof?, 33 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 325, 342-43 (1999). Such findings mirror a 1992 study that found that 73% of
the sample of police interviewers were certain of the guilt of the suspect prior to the
commencement of the interview and, in 80% of cases, the stated aim of the interview was simply
to obtain a confession. Stephen Moston, Geoffrey M. Stephenson & Thomas M. Williamson, The
Effects of Case Characteristics on Suspect Behaviour During Police Questioning, 32 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 23, 33-34 (1992). This was particularly so when the suspect had previous
convictions. Id. at 26. A later study by the Police Research Group censured officers for
appearing to have prejudged the outcomes of cases and for failing to be impartial. Many were
judged to be biased or "blinkered," in their unwillingness to consider all aspects of the case or to
accept the possibility of any deficiency in their investigation. JANET E. STOCKDALE & PETER J.
GRESHAM, POLICE RESEARCH GROUP, THE PRESENTATION OF POLICE EVIDENCE IN COURT 12
(1995), http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/prgpdfs/fprs 15.pdf.
175. This is of crucial importance as there is an enduring tension between the police and the
CPS, which has the power to abandon prosecutions against the wishes of the police. In order to
prevent such "discontinuances," the police inevitably underplay any areas of uncertainty (as
presented by unused material) in order to present the case as "'winnable." In his study of
detectives at work, Ericson characterized this as a process of "information control": "[T]he
investigations they do or do not undertake; the questions they do and do not ask; the
interpretations they do and do not give to the answers; the written accounts they give and what
they leave out." RICHARD V. ERICSON, MAKING CRIME: A STUDY OF DETECTIVE WORK ix
(1981).
176. "Most police officers have one very specific goal in mind, to produce guilty people
before the courts and see them justly convicted." ROBERT CHESSHYRE, THE FORCE: INSIDE THE
POLICE 5 (1989).
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gatherer of evidence rather than an agent of the prosecution, 177 but this
role does not come naturally to many officers and creates undeniable
tensions. 178  Thus, although the impact of the latest amendments to
CPIA disclosure has yet to be felt, there is little expectation that merely
modifying the wording of the provisions will fundamentally alter the
approach of investigators towards their disclosure obligations.
These observations apply equally to the current situation in Illinois.
In Illinois, as well as generally throughout the United States, the
responsibility for serious cases of non-disclosure of exculpatory
evidence has rested with prosecutors 179 more so than on the police or
other investigative personnel, which has been the case in the United
Kingdom, 180 but the disclosure violations and their underlying reasons
are much the same in both countries. The trouble with disclosure
appears to arise from the ineffectiveness of a system dependent on the
discretion of individual prosecutors and officers and the adversarial
context within which they carry out their disclosure duties. 18 1 Mere
amplification of the duty to disclose is insufficient to dislodge "deeply
ingrained norms about the proper role of the prosecutor as zealous
advocate."'1 82 Justice Marshall, in his dissent in Bagley, aptly described
the problem:
At the trial level, the duty of the state to effectuate Brady devolves
into the duty of the prosecutor; the dual role that the prosecutor must
play poses a serious obstacle to implementing Brady. The prosecutor
is by trade, if not necessity, a zealous advocate. He is a trained
attorney who must aggressively seek convictions in court on behalf of
177. The principle of the prosecutor as working for the furtherance of justice is well
established. R v. Thursfield, (1838) 173 Eng. Rep. 490. Calls for the police to adopt a more
impartial approach have also come from a former Chief of Her Majesty's Inspectorate who
recommended that the police "must cease to believe that they are solely the agents of the
prosecution and become what ... they were originally designed to be, the gatherers of evidence."
John Woodcock, Why We Need a Revolution, POLICE REV., Oct. 16, 1992, at 1929, 1932.
178. This echoes the comments of the former Director of Public Prosecutions, David Calvert-
Smith, that "[u]nused material is a bore and much less fun than the preparation and presentation
of the case. There is therefore an instinctive and understandable desire to get through it as
quickly as possible." D. Calvert Smith, The Prosecuting Authority's Role: Making the Criminal
Procedure and Investigations Act Work to Facilitate Fair Trials and Just Verdicts, in
DISCLOSURE UNDER THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AND INVESTIGATIONS ACT 1996 (conference
papers) (BAFS 1999).
179. See, e.g., Marshall Testimony, supra note 68, at 3-4 (discussing prosecutorial failure to
disclose exculpatory evidence); but see Yaroshefsky, supra note 74, at 285 (suggesting that
"[a]ny commission established to examine prosecutorial misconduct should necessarily examine
the oversight of police agencies by prosecutors' offices").
180. See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
181. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text; Hoeffel, supra note 78, at 1142--44.
182. Hoeffel, supra note 78, at 1151.
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a victimized public. At the same time, as a representative of the state,
he must place foremost in his hierarchy of interests the determination
of truth. Thus, for purposes of Brady, the prosecutor must abandon
his role as an advocate and pore through his files, as objectively as
possible, to identify the material that could undermine his case. Given
this obviously unharmonious role, it is not surprising that these
advocates oftentimes overlook or downplay potentially favorable
evidence, often in cases in which there is no doubt that the failure to
disclose was a result of absolute good faith. 183
Moreover, the high degree of discretion granted prosecutors under the
Bagley materiality standard, together with the remote prospect of
reversal 184 and the unlikely event of professional sanctions, 185 provides
little assurance that all prosecutors "will resolve doubtful questions in
favor of disclosure." 186 Academics have been making these points for
years, 187 yet little movement has been made toward true reform.
Perhaps, the concrete example set by the UK experience will assist
United States policymakers in putting hypothesis into practice.
Although the Illinois reforms and proposals for reform are well-
intended, it is questionable as to whether they will actually reduce the
number of cases in which compliance fails to occur. None of the recent
additions are novel; all are based on long-standing constitutional and
ethical duties. 188 But even the innovative and more extensive disclosure
183. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 696-97 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
184. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text (detailing the burden on the defendant to
prove a "true" Brady violation).
185. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. See also Yaroshefsky, supra note 74, at 289-
96 (enumerating six reasons for current unwillingness to discipline prosecutors, including belief
that internal controls adequately regulate prosecutorial misconduct and political power of
executive branch). But see Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many
Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 70 (1995) (arguing that
critics of formal disciplinary mechanisms overlook the importance of informal judicial controls
on prosecutorial misconduct); Bruce A. Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System,
24 CRIM. L. BULL. 126, 145 (1988) (arguing that critics exaggerate occurrence and gravity of
prosecutorial misconduct).
186. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (stating that "the prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure"). It is worth noting that internal advancement
for prosecutors may depend on conviction rates. See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Role of
Prosecutors in Dealing with Police Abuse: The Lessons of Los Angeles, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
305, 321 (2001) ("Promotions within the Los Angeles District Attorney's office often include
consideration of conviction rates."); Catherine Ferguson-Gilbert, Comment, It Is Not Whether
You Win or Lose, It is How You Play the Game: Is the Win-Loss Scorekeeping Mentality Doing
Justice for Prosecutors?, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 283, 293 (2001) ("Promotions for subordinate
prosecutors depend on their 'scores' for convictions.").
187. See, e.g., supra note 74 (listing various articles addressing negative impact of adversarial
nature of prosecutorial role on disclosure duties).
188. The commentary to the new Supreme Court provisions and the Commission
recommendations bear out this point. See, e.g., ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt.
[Vol. 38
UK Lessons for Illinois Disclosure
reforms proposed by the Commission are destined to fail. Regardless of
whether the duty to disclose is reaffirmed by broad rules or by the
introduction of a more formal or statutory system, the crime-control
ethos of policing and prosecution will always weaken the safeguards
within the disclosure process. As one observer has noted, "The real
question remains whether restating and reminding will result in
reform." 189 And the answer, based on the UK disclosure experience,
appears to be a resounding no.
B. Real Reform
Recognition that problems with disclosure emanate from the criminal
justice system itself presents a seemingly intractable problem. 190
Nonetheless, if our adversarial system of justice and operational culture
of the prosecutor's office are the underlying culprits, then reform must
be targeted at compelling prosecutorial observance of Brady
obligations. 191 To this end, scholars have proposed a variety of cures.
Chief among the suggestions are harsher sanctions for prosecutors who
commit Brady violations. For example, Fred Zacharias recommends
that disciplinary authorities target supervisors responsible for the
"ethos" of the prosecutor's office. 19 2  Richard Rosen suggests that
(2001) (noting that paragraph (a) is substantially similar to a standard of the American Bar
Association Standards for Criminal Justice and restates a principle noted in a 1924 Illinois
Supreme Court case and a 1935 United States Supreme Court case); RYAN COMMISSION
REPORT, supra note 1, at 121 (Commentary to Recommendation 51) (noting that Supreme Court
Rule 412 already requires state to disclose information about witnesses and their criminal records
but recommending that rule "make clear that it is particularly important" that information relevant
to witness be "promptly provided" to defense).
189. Penny J. White, Errors and Ethics: Dilemmas in Death, 29 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1265, 1294
(2001) (discussing special committee proposals for changing Illinois Supreme Court rules).
190. Janet Hoeffel ultimately concludes that, short of a drastic change in the culture of our
adversarial system, solutions are unavailing because of "deeply ingrained norms about the proper
role of the prosecutor as zealous advocate." Hoeffel, supra note 78, at 1151.
191. The same is true in the United Kingdom where one factor that has consistently
undermined the operation of the disclosure regime has been the absence of any significant
sanction for those investigators who cannot, or will not, apply the provisions correctly. See Mike
Redmayne, Process Gains and Process Values: The Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act
1996, 60 MOD. L. REv. 79, 93 (1997) (noting lack of specific sanctions in Act). The result is a
situation in which officers are able to offer perfunctory or "token" disclosure with little or no
prospect of adverse consequence. From the perspective of the investigator, the worst that can
happen is that the case is lost. However, this is of minimal importance to the investigator as there
is no personal loss incurred. Within the crime-control culture of the police, a lost case is
invariably the fault of other aspects of the criminal justice system, such as the CPS or the courts.
Thus, there is no loss of status or reputation attached to the ultimate failure of the prosecution.
Officers are able to justify perfunctory disclosure on the grounds of workload pressure and the
absence of disciplinary implications merely encourages a minimalist approach to the disclosure
obligations.
192. Zacharias, supra note 74, at 108-09.
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courts and attorney disciplinary bodies start punishing Brady violations
more severely. 193  Ellen Yaroshefsky proposes that independent state
and federal commissions be created to examine wrongful conviction
cases and enforce disciplinary rules for prosecutors. 194
Other commentators urge states to better protect the due process
right. For example, Joseph Weeks suggests that states impose more
substantial disclosure obligations under their state constitutions.
195
Janet Hoeffel argues that courts could "create better legal standards for
the due process violation than those set as the floor in Bagley."'
196
Similar solutions have been offered in Illinois. In a statement made
before the Illinois House Prosecutorial Misconduct Committee,
Professor Lawrence Marshall suggested that the state "put some real
bite into the disciplinary system" by creating a special regulatory body
to investigate and prosecute prosecutors. 197 As described by Professor
Marshall, "Judges should be required to refer all cases on which they
find misconduct to this body, and this body should be charged with the
duty of ensuring that only individuals with unblemished records should
be trusted with the title prosecutor."' 198  He also requested that the
Committee consider reducing the absolute immunity provided to
prosecutors to qualified immunity, which would expose prosecutors
who intentionally violate disclosure rules to civil suits.199 Finally,
Professor Marshall appealed to legislators to statutorily augment the
standard set in Bagley.200 This particular recommendation found new
life in a House bill requiring prosecutors to disclose exculpatory
evidence to the defense.20 1 The drafted statute set forth a remedy for
193. Rosen, supra note 64, at 736.
194. Yaroshefsky, supra note 74, at 297-98.
195. Weeks, supra note 60, at 903-14.
196. Hoeffel, supra note78, at 1151.
197. Marshall Testimony, supra note 68, at 6-7.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 7.
200. Id. at 6. Professor Marshall recommended that Illinois courts be required to reverse
convictions in cases in which prosecutorial misconduct was intentional. Id. To avoid reversal in
cases of unintentional misconduct, the state would need to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
the misconduct did not affect the result at trial. Id. In addition, Professor Marshall proposed that
the state create a specialized disciplinary commission to investigate and prosecute charges of
misconduct and encourage civil accountability among prosecutors by reducing the absolute
immunity enjoyed by prosecutors to the qualified immunity retained by other government
officials. Id.
201. Former State Rep. James B. Durkin, who served as chair of the House Special
Committee on Prosecutorial Misconduct, sponsored this bill in February 2001. H.B. 1843 92d
Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2001) available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/legisnet92/
hbgroups/hb/920HB 1843LV.html (last visited on Apr. 9, 2007).
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Brady violations: new trials for defendants if prosecutors withheld
exculpatory evidence absent clear and convincing evidence that the
misconduct did not affect the trial outcomes.2 °2 Although the bill died
in committee,20 3 the good intentions that fueled it need not. Unless
officers are held accountable for defective disclosure decisions by
means of sanctions or by reversing convictions that spring from
disclosure violations, there is little likelihood that they will adopt a
more thorough approach to their disclosure obligations.
CONCLUSION
Illinois has drawn national attention in its attempts to redress a spate
of wrongful convictions uncovered in recent years. As the number of
death row exonerations continues to climb, the need for reform
increases. This article is an important first step toward the development
of a workable model of disclosure for the State of Illinois. Illinois
prosecutors bear evidentiary disclosure responsibilities under the United
States Constitution and state rules, but revelations of errors in capital
cases demonstrate that these protections can fail, with potentially lethal
consequences. Similar failures in the United Kingdom have triggered a
mixture of judicial, executive, and legislative response, but the UK
experience has shown that mere fortification of disclosure
responsibilities is insufficient to curb violations. Reinforcement via
reminders will not work to contain the adversarial and crime control
culture of the prosecutor's office, but reinforcement via enforcement
will. Accordingly, frank discussion among policymakers about a
system of accountability for prosecutors is pivotal to stemming the
injustices that flow from Brady violations.
American disclosure practice is built on trust-trust in prosecutors as
representatives of our government to choose public justice over personal
victory;204 trust that, although prosecutors may strike hard blows, they
will not strike foul ones. 20 5  But the mounting numbers of highly
publicized wrongful convictions have shaken society's confidence in
202. Id. If the failure to disclose related only to sentencing, the bill required the court to
..vacate the sentence and conduct a new sentencing hearing" unless the State can establish "by
clear and convincing evidence" that the sentence was appropriate. Id.
203. Information on the status of H.B. 1843 available at http://www.ilga.gov/legislation/
legisnet92/status/920HB1843.html (last visited on Apr. 9, 2007). H.B. 1843 had many detractors.
See Prosecutors United to Form Response Unit, ISBA Bar News, Vol. 41, No. 5 (Oct. 2, 2000)
(describing newly formed association of 700-plus Illinois prosecutors and noting association's
objections to proposed statutory changes to disclosure rule).
204. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (noting that prosecution's interest in
criminal case "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done").
205. Id.
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the criminal justice system. We have begun to question our faith, and
state legislators must take measures to preserve it.
